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The Alien Tort Claims Act: Temporary
Stopgap Measure or Permanent
Remedy?

Borchien Lai*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the world has become smaller through technological advances in
travel and communication, the international marketplace has grown larger.
The United Nations ("U.N.") estimates that the number of multinational
corporations tripled between 1988 and 1997 to 60,000.1 As these
corporations increase their investments abroad, they also face
proportionately increasing pressure from investors to run successful
operations and increase profits.
Multinational
The result of this dynamic is well-documented.
corporations invest heavily in underdeveloped countries where natural
resources are abundant and labor is cheap. To facilitate operations in the
country, the corporations must establish a rapport with the host
governments-and often, in the course of establishing ideal business
conditions, the host governments engage in criminal acts, including
genocide and forced labor, that violate international human rights
agreements. Not only do multinational corporations benefit from the
government's misconduct, but the corporation may influence or even
encourage the government via the corporation's substantial investments.
Because of this facet of their relationship, it is commonly thought that
multinational corporations should bear some responsibility for righting any
violations that take place because of business dealings with underdeveloped
However, multinational
countries and offer redress for victims.
corporations have largely escaped liability for these governments' actions in
the past.
This trend may soon change. Recent litigation in the United States has
JD Candidate, 2006, Northwestern University School of Law.
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featured foreign plaintiffs arguing that U.S. federal district courts have
jurisdiction to hear their claims against multinational corporations under the
Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA").2 Prior to this resurgence, the ATCA had
been used in litigation only a handful of times.3 The new development has
drawn praise from human rights activists and even some corporate
executives who believe the ATCA can solve the problem of imperfect
business practices world-wide. 4
Nonetheless, the ATCA is still an
unproven tool.
Of the nearly three dozen cases brought against multinational
corporations for human rights and environmental violations,5 not one has
actually been fully litigated, nor has a judgment been entered against any
corporate defendants. Before settling in December 2004, Doe v. Unocal6
Corp. was the furthest a case had advanced in the federal court system.
Unocal was also the first case brought against multinational corporations
under the ATCA for human rights violations, lasting nearly 10 years.7 The
plaintiffs were citizens of Myanmar who alleged that the Unocal
Corporation was responsible for human rights violations committed during
the construction of a $1.2 billion pipeline. Until the case settled, Unocal
had been slated for rehearing by the Ninth Circuit pending the U.S.
Supreme Court ruling in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,9 which was expected to
provide some guidance for circuit courts attempting to interpret the ATCA.
Sosa may not have truly provided guidance for the lower courts, but it
did effectively legitimize causes of action under the ATCA. 10 Although the
specific claim in Sosa was dismissed, the ruling was largely seen by human
rights activists as a victory,' 1 because the Supreme Court held that the First
Congress intended "that the district courts would recognize private causes
2Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
3See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), on remand, 577 F. Supp. 860

(E.D.N.Y. 1984).

4 See Lorraine Woellert, And Justicefor All?, Bus. WK. , May 3, 2004, at 76.
5See USAENGAGE.ORG, The Alien Tort Provision: Correcting the Abuse of an Early
Federalist
Statute,
at
http://www.usaengage.org/legislative/2003/alientort/
alientorttpcases.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2005).
6See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part sub nom, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003), aff'd en banc, 403 F.3d
708 (9th Cir. 2005).
7 Kenny Bruno, De-Globalizing Justice: The Corporate Campaign to Strip Foreign
Victims of CorporateInduced Human Rights Violations of the Right to Sue in U.S. Courts,
MULTINATIONAL
MONITOR,
vol. 24, number 3 (March 2003), available at
http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2003/03march/march03corp2.html
8 Unocal, 395 F.3d. at 939-40.
9 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004).
10 Id. at 2761-62.

1See Linda Greenhouse, Human Rights Abuses Are Held to Fall Under US. Courts,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 30, 2004, at A21.
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of action for certain torts in violation of the law of nations ...
However, the Court cautioned that there should be a "restrained conception
of the discretion a federal court should exercise in considering a new cause
of action of this kind." 13 In addition, Sosa did little to assuage the doubts or
smooth the kinks that had plagued ATCA litigation, and did not answer the
question of whether the ATCA could become a future tool for holding
multinational corporations responsible for human rights violations abroad.
Analysts will undoubtedly see Unocal Corporation's willingness to
settle as an indication that at least some corporate counsels think the ruling
in Sosa bodes ominously for multinational corporations who persist in
condoning, if not committing, human rights violations. Indeed, it seems
likely that more corporations will choose to settle instead of risking a long,
drawn out public trial. Threatening litigation under the ATCA and forcing
corporations to settle will help to curb the incidences of human rights
violations. However, it is still only a stopgap measure that should not be
regarded as a permanent resolution to human
rights litigation, despite the
14
advocates.
rights
human
many
of
beliefs
As will be discussed in this article, the existence and availability of the
ATCA as a vehicle for redress is too precarious and vulnerable to be
consistently relied upon by the international community. If the ATCA is
the only means available for holding multinational corporations responsible
for human rights violations, then the world will find itself sorely unprepared
for future corporate violations if the ATCA becomes unavailable. In
addition, using ATCA litigation as a long-term mechanism for addressing
human rights violations would create an inappropriate role for the United
States court system as an international forum.
ATCA litigation may temporarily inconvenience multinational
corporations and thereby deter some potential human rights violations, but
there are too many problems for it to be sufficient in the long run. This
article will focus on the flaws with the ATCA as a tool to bring human
rights violators to justice. Part II will give a brief history of the ATCA and
the path it has taken to grant U.S. federal courts jurisdiction over
multinational corporations, some of which are not even incorporated or
based in the United States. Part III will then examine four different cases
brought before U.S. federal courts. The cases will serve as a backdrop to
reveal some of the glaring problems with relying on the ATCA as a global
solution to human rights violations. In Part IV, this article will discuss in
detail the most glaring flaws of ATCA litigation.
Finally, the paper will briefly discuss how these problems expose a
12 Sosa,
13 Id.

124 S.Ct. at 2761.
at 2762.

14 See Michael O'Donnell, Companies Abuse Human Rights and the Feds Don't Care,

L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2003, at B11.
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void in the international legal construct. Plaintiffs have rallied around the
ATCA as a limited legal alternative because no other means of redress are
available. Nonetheless, the ATCA is insufficient. That plaintiffs now rely
heavily on the ATCA should bring these problems to the forefront of our
society's conscience. The leaders of the world and human rights advocates
must work together to craft a permanent solution, such as an international
tribunal, instead of placing all their eggs in this porous, fragile basket of the
ATCA.
II. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE ALIEN TORT
CLAIMS ACT
Using the ATCA to litigate human rights violations is a recent
development. Using the ATCA to sue multinational corporations is an even
newer option. The first multinational corporation was sued in 1996."5
Before human rights litigation, the ATCA was rarely used, and then for an
entirely different purpose from suing human rights violators.
The ATCA states that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 1 6 The three
elements embedded in the statute are that 1) the plaintiff must be an alien;
2) the plaintiff must be suing for a tort; and 3) the tort
7 must be in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.1
From 1789 until 1980, there were only twenty-one suits brought under
the ATCA."8 In 1980, plaintiffs tried for the first time to use the ATCA to
sue for human rights violations in the United States.' 9 In Filartigav. PenaIrala, the action was brought by Dr. Joel Filartiga and his daughter Dolly,
both citizens of Paraguay, in the Eastern District of New York against
Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, the Inspector General of Police in Ascension,
Paraguay, for the wrongful death of Dr. Filartiga's seventeen-year old son,
Joelito. 20 Although the district court had personal jurisdiction over PenaIrala because Filartiga sued Pena-Irala while he was in the United States,
the court dismissed the suit for want of subject matter jurisdiction.2'
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District
Court, asserting that the court had jurisdiction under the ATCA, and that
"deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates
15Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 880.
16 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
17 id.

18Natalie Bridgeman, Human Rights Litigation Under the ATCA
Environmental Claims, 6 YALE HuM. RTs. & Dev. L.J. 1, 2 (2003).
'" Filartiga,630 F.2d at 878.
20 Id.
21 Id.

as a Proxy for
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universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights,
regardless of the nationality of the parties. 22 The court further held that
"whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien
within our borders, [the ATCA] provides federal jurisdiction., 23 On
plaintiffs both compensatory and
remand, the district court awarded the
24
punitive damages and attorney's fees.
Human rights litigation under the ATCA progressed further with Kadic
v. Karadzic, in which a district court indicated for the first time that private
actors could be held liable for human rights violations.25 In that case, the
defendant, Karadzic, argued that since international law and norms applied
only to nation-states and people acting under the color of state law, the
plaintiffs did not have a cause of action under the ATCA.2 6 The Second
Circuit ultimately found that although Karadzic was not a state official per
se, his position and status were sufficient to find that he acted under the
color of law.27 The court also held that for jus cogens violations such as
war crimes and genocide, a plaintiff did not have to show state action.2 8
Kadic further established that even for non-jus cogens violations a cause of
action could exist against private actors under29 the ATCA, if the plaintiff
showed that they acted with "the color of law.",
But despite decisions for plaintiffs in both Filartiga and Kadic,
obtaining an actual remedy under the ATCA proved difficult. In Filartiga,
after twenty-five years the plaintiffs have yet to recover damages from the
defendant, 30 and in Kadic, the defendant refused to recognize the court's
jurisdiction and was not even present at the trial.31
Subsequent plaintiffs faced other difficulties when trying to sue state
actors under the ATCA, and in fact, these difficulties still exist today. For
example, to state a cause of action, plaintiffs must establish personal
jurisdiction over the defendant by serving their complaints in the United
22 Id.
23 Id.

24Filartiga,577 F.2d. at 865.
25Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995).
26 Id. at 237.
27 Id. at

245.

28Id. at 239. A jus cogens norm is a rule of international law that prevails over any

conflicting international rule. Egregious human rights violations such as genocide, slavery,
and racial discrimination have been deemed to have jus cogens status. See DAVID
WEISSBRODT ET AL., INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 23 (3d ed. 2001).

29See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244-45.

30See Jonathan A. Bush, Nuremberg: The Modern Law of War and its Limitations, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 2022, 2069 (1999) (reviewing ALFRED A. KNOPF, THE ANATOMY OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992)).
31See Margaret G. Perl, Not Just Another Mass Tort: Using Class Actions to Redress

InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 88 GEO. L.J. 773, 795 (2000).
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States. 32 But when government defendants visit the United States on visits
of state, they are protected by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
("FSIA"), which provides specific guidelines for service of foreign states or
a political subdivision of a foreign state.3 3 The FSIA also states that "a
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States. 34
These obstacles were so encumbering that they soon led plaintiffs to
sue corporations. Suing corporations enables plaintiffs to bypass many
difficulties.
For example, multinational corporations with minimum
contacts in the United States are held to be under the jurisdiction of federal
35
courts.
They are also private actors who do not have diplomatic immunity
or sovereign immunity under the FSIA.36 In addition, by the nature of the
minimum contacts in the United States, corporations usually have assets
here that can be frozen or used to satisfy court-ordered damages.
After Unocal became the first corporation sued under the ATCA in
1996, 37 other plaintiffs followed suit. As mentioned previously, ATCA
litigation has put corporations on notice that they may be sued for human
rights violations in the countries where they operate, but it is still unclear
whether the suits will provide plaintiffs with redress. While district courts
and circuit courts have affirmed causes of action under the ATCA, no
judgment has ever been entered against a defendant corporation.
III. FOUR CASES SEEKING JURISDICTION UNDER THE ATCA
This article will focus on four ATCA human rights cases: Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc.,38 Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte, PLC., 39 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
40
Petroleum,
and Sarei v. Rio Tinto.41 None of the plaintiffs in these cases
were U.S. citizens,
and one of the multinational corporate defendants was

32 See Kadic,

70 F.3d at 248.

33 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (2004).
34Id. § 1604. In Filartiga,the defendant was in the United States of his own volition,
and not on a diplomatic mission, when he was sued. 630 F.2d at 879.
35 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
36 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604.

37See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 880.
38 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93-C7527, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
11, 1994), dismissed, 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), remanded sub nom, Jota v. Texaco,
Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998), mandamus denied, 241 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2001),
dismissed, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), modified and affd, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.
2002).
39Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (S.D. Fla. 2003), aff'd
in part and vacated in part,416 F.3d 1242 (11 th Cir. 2005).
40 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96-C8386, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2002).

41Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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not even incorporated in the United States.4 2 The Aguinda, Sarei, Aldana
and Wiwa opinions help to analyze the issues surrounding ATCA litigation
today. Of these cases, Aguinda deals primarily with human rights from an
environmental harm perspective, Aldana and Wiwa deal with human rights
violations directly, and Sarei encompasses both environmental and direct
human rights violations. Comparing these cases will lay a foundation for
discussing the consequences of filing suit under the ATCA. The rationale
of the decisions accompanying these cases reveals the problems with the
theory that the ATCA can serve as a lasting mechanism to curb human
rights violations.
These four cases are only a small, non-representative sample of the
roughly sixty cases brought before U.S. federal courts under the ATCA
between 1980 and 2003 (not all of which were against multinational
corporations).43 For example, two of the four cases in this sample survived
motions to dismiss, but a much smaller percentage of all ATCA cases
achieved even this minor victory in federal court. 4
Nonetheless, the cases are still illustrative of ATCA litigation. These
cases follow the general trend characterized by a state actor and a
corporation becoming involved in human rights violations in the course of
the corporation's business dealings abroad. Sadly, the number of cases that
plaintiffs bring, and the gross violations they allege, may be only a fraction
of the human rights violations and environmental torts committed by
multinational corporations. Despite the vigilance of non-governmental
organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Now and
Amnesty International, violations may still go unreported or unnoticed.45
There might also be cases that have been both reported and noticed, but that
have not yet found legal representation. Finally, there may be plaintiffs that
had been awaiting the outcome of Doe v. Unocal before determining in
which circuit to sue. The increasing volume of ATCA cases involving
corporations reflects the likelihood that international corporations either
commit or implicitly consent to the commission of human rights violations.
These violations have long gone unnoticed by the international community.
The volume of cases also shows the world the lack of legal remedies
available in the international community.
U.S. federal courts have struggled admirably to adjudicate these cases,
but difficulties clearly remain. Examining the following four cases will
42

See Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *3 (explaining that Royal Dutch Petroleum

was not incorporated in the United States).
43Bridgeman, supra note 18, at 9.
44Id. at 10-26.
45See Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, "Germanyfor Germans ":Xenophobia and Racist
Violence in Germany (1995), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/g/germany/
germany954.pdf.
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highlight those difficulties and explain why an international tribunal is
necessary. However, before analyzing the opinions it is important to first
understand the facts.
46

A. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.

Wiwa was brought by former citizens and residents of Nigeria against
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. for a litany of human rights abuses. 47 Two of
the four plaintiffs sued on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa and John Kpuinen, in
addition to themselves. Both Saro-Wiwa and Kpuinen were active in the
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People ("MOSOP"), which was
formed to oppose the appropriation of Ogoni land without adequate
compensation. MOSOP also rallied to oppose the severe environmental
damage caused by the defendant's operations in the region.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. and Shell Transport and Trading
Company, a co-defendant, were at the time corporations incorporated in the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, respectively. Through their whollyowned subsidiary, Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd.
("Shell Nigeria"), these corporations had extensive operations in Nigeria.4 8
In one of the more harrowing course of events to reach U.S. federal
courts under the ATCA, the corporate defendants recruited Nigerian police
and military to suppress MOSOP. They also "provided logistical support,
transportation, and weapons to Nigerian authorities to attack Ogoni villages
and stifle opposition to Shell's oil-excavation activities., 49 In the course of
these events, "Ogoni residents ... were beaten, raped, shot and/or killed

.... ,50 Finally, and most egregiously, in the events leading directly to the
current litigation, Ken Saro-Wiwa and John Kpuinen were hanged after a
scripted murder conviction before a special tribunal.
The plaintiffs in Wiwa sued for the tortious acts of: 1) summary
execution; 2) crimes against humanity; 3) torture; 4) cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment; 5) arbitrary arrest and detention; and 6) violation of
the rights to life, liberty and security of person and peaceful assembly and
association. 51
The district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the
claims by Owens Wiwa for the fifth and sixth claims, and denied the
46

47
48
49

Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *1.
Id. at *6.

Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *5.

50 Id.
"' Id. at *6.
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motion to dismiss with regard to all other claims. The court
also granted
52
plaintiffs time to re-plead those claims that were dismissed.
B. Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc.

53

The Aldana case was brought by Guatemalan citizens who filed suit
against the multinational corporation that owns Compania De Desarollo
Bananero De Guatemala, S.A. ("Bandegua").54 The plaintiffs were, at the
time, former union officers who had represented the unionized workers at
Bandegua.
On October 13, 1999, after labor negotiations failed, the workers of the
banana plantation were on the eve of a union-organized strike.55 That
evening, a band of Guatemalans armed with guns kidnapped the union
officers, forced them to lure other officers to the union office, and
threatened to kill them. The gunmen also shoved and beat the union
officers. While the union officers were detained at gunpoint, a mayoral
candidate arrived and "brokered a consensus" with the union officers.
Despite the so-called agreement, the gunmen continued their conduct. The
mayoral candidate, two union officers and some of the gunmen went to a
radio station where the gunmen forced the two union officers to announce
on the radio that the labor dispute was over, and that the workers should
return to work the next day. The union officers
56 were also forced to
announce that they were resigning their union posts.
Still at gunpoint, the two union officers were then taken back to the
union office, where they were made to sign resignation letters. These letters
were immediately faxed to the owners of the plantation. The Bandegua
security officer was present at the union office and allegedly communicated
by walkie-talkie with members of the Bandegua management staff. The
gunmen threatened to kill the union officers if they did not leave the
plantation area immediately and then released them. The union officers
collected their families and fled to Guatemala City where they attempted to
file a complaint with the Minister of Labor. There, they found that the
General Manager of Bandegua had already notified the Minister of Labor of
the officers' "voluntary" resignations. With the intervention of the United
States Embassy, the union officers were relocated to the United States and
filed suit in federal court. 57
52 Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *101.
53 Aldana, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1285.
14

Id. at 1288.

55 Id. at 1288-89.
56 Id. at 1290.
57

Id.
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The plaintiffs in Aldana brought their case against the corporation for
the tortious acts of: "1) torture, 2) kidnapping, 3) unlawful detention, 4)
crimes against humanity and 5) denial of fundamental fight to associate and
organize. 58
The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss all claims. On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court on
all counts except torture.59
60

C. Sarei v. Rio Tinto

Sarei is the most illustrative case where the actions of a multinational
corporation were shown to 6profoundly impact the civil and political
situation of a foreign country. 6 The defendant corporations, Rio Tinto PLC
and Rio Tinto Limited (together "Rio Tinto"), wanted to build a copper
mine on Bougainville, a small island just off the main island of Papua New
Guinea.
However, Rio Tinto needed the cooperation of Papua New
Guinea's government "because constructing the mine necessitated
62
displacing villages and destroying massive portions of the rain forest.
To overcome this dilemma, Rio Tinto allegedly offered the Papua New
Guinea government a portion of the profits from this venture. When Rio
Tinto encountered resistance on the island from residents who fought
displacement, the government of Papua New Guinea responded swiftly.
The government arrested 200 Bougainvilleans for expelling an exploration
team from their land; when other Bougainvilleans rejected an offer to
purchase their land, the government flew 100 riot police to the island to
help the Rio Tinto surveyors. At one point, the riot police fired tear gas
canisters at villagers, and when the villagers did not disperse, the riot
police
"charged them with their batons, clubbing both men and women., 63
As planned, Rio Tinto commenced their operations, causing extensive
environmental harm. The corporate defendants razed huge portions of rain
forest, destroyed "fertile river valleys," killed fish populations by depositing
mine waste into the river, caused "respiratory infections and asthma" from
mine emissions, damaged crops, and "forced many animals out of their
habitats." 64 In short, the plaintiffs alleged that "Rio Tinto's destruction of
the island's land and environment 'ripped apart' the culture, economy, and
life of Bougainville. 6' 5 Amazingly, the violations do not end there.
Id. at 1291.
59Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 416 F.3d 1242 (1 lth Cir. 2005).
60 Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
61 id.
62 Id. at 1121.
63 Id. at 1122 (quoting the First Amended Compl. 105).
58

64Id. at 1122-23.
65 Id. at 1124 (quoting the First Amended. Compl.

155).
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For sixteen years after the mine's opening, the Bougainvilleans
organized protests. Rio Tinto continued to operate until some of the
removed landowners demolished machinery with dynamite. In response,
Rio Tinto warned the Papua New Guinean government that it would no
longer invest in Papua New Guinea "if the government did not quell the
uprising so that the company could recommence operations." ' 6 The
government promptly sent troops to the island. Rio Tinto allegedly
provided those troops with logistical support. The actions resulted in civil
war. Plaintiffs estimate that 15,000 Bougainvilleans died during this
conflict, of which 10,000 died during a blockade which "prevented
medicine, clothing
and other essential supplies from reaching"
67
Bougainville.
The plaintiffs sued in the U.S. federal courts for the human rights
violations of: 1) crimes against humanity; 2) war crimes/murder; 3)
violation of the rights to life, health, and security of the person; 4) racial
discrimination; 5) cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; 6) violation of
international environmental rights; and 7) a consistent pattern of gross
violations of human rights.68
The district court ultimately dismissed all of plaintiffs' claims, in large
part on the basis of the political question doctrine.
69

D. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.

In a purely environmental claim, the plaintiffs in Aguinda are
Ecuadorian and Peruvian citizens. They filed suit against Texaco, Inc. for
allegedly dumping tens of millions of gallons of crude oil and toxic waste
water into the surrounding ecosystem on a daily basis.70 The plaintiffs
claim that the practice continued for twenty years while the defendant
corporation drilled for oil in Ecuador's Amazon Basin. By improperly
disposing of the hazardous material, the corporation annihilated tropical
rain forest habitats, debilitated the indigenous people living in the rain
forest, and threatened the existence of the Amazon Basin habitats.71
As a result of the corporation's operations in the Amazon Basin, there
has been a noticeable increase in cancer and miscarriages. The plaintiffs
also allege that the defendant's waste-dumping
practices pushed three
2
indigenous tribes to the brink of extinction.
Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1125.
Id. at 1126-27 (quoting the First Amended Compl.
id.
69 Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 470.
66

67
68

196).

70 FRENTE PARA LA DEFENSA DE LA AMAZONiA, Aguinda v. Texaco: Why a Law Suit?, at

http://www.texacorainforest.com/why/index.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
71

Id.

72 Id.
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The Peruvian plaintiffs joined the suit when they discovered that the
toxic waste had entered a river and flowed into the Peruvian Amazon.7 3 The
Second Circuit dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims.
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE ATCA ILLUSTRATED BY THESE
FOUR CASES
These cases identify and illustrate the drawbacks of ATCA litigation.
Although three of these cases were summarily dismissed, and the fourth is
not yet resolved, these cases are still diverse enough to provide various
perspectives on the issues addressed here. Not only did each court use
distinct and conflicting rationales, but the courts alternately followed and
ignored previous federal court precedent to reach their decisions. These
perplexing opinions will help us to identify five general problems with
ATCA litigation: 1) the opinions reveal the federal courts' reluctance to
grant causes of action under the ATCA; 2) even after Sosa, federal courts
are uncertain which standards to apply when determining if the ATCA
applies; 3) rulings under the ATCA against even a private party can
impinge on the constitutional duties of both the executive and legislative
branches of the United States; 74 4) it is problematic for the U.S. courts to
impose their own policies and opinions on the international community by
being the sole forum for hearing international human rights violations
committed by foreign governments and multinational corporations; and 5)
even assuming a successful outcome for the plaintiff, the actual perpetrators
of human rights violations are not brought to justice.
A. Federal Courts' Reluctance to Establish New Causes of Action Under
the ATCA
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Sosa that the jurisdictional element
of the ATCA "enabled federal courts to hear claims in a very limited
category defined by the law of nations. 7 5 The Court also acknowledged
that "torts in violation of the law of nations would have been recognized
with the common law of the time."76 This ruling has been lauded by some
as "losing the battle but winning the war,"77 but the Supreme Court insisted
that the jurisdictional intent of the ATCA was likely "enacted on the
73 FRENTE PARA LA DEFENSA DE LA AMAZONA, After the Gold Rush: The Problem,
at

http://www.texacorainforest.org/problem.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
74 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
10.

71 Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2754.
76 Id. at 2755.

77 Anthony J. Sebok, Is the Alien Tort Claims Act a Powerful Tool? (July 12, 2004), at

http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/07/12/sebok.alien.tort.claims. This phrase refers to the fact
that the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the possibility of a cause of action under the ATCA
but ultimately found no cause of action in Sosa.
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understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the
modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal
liability."7 8 Sosa actually restricted the scope of the ATCA to a very
narrow cause of action.
Even when a court holds that a cause of action exists under the ATCA,
it must consider other issues that would promote limiting its scope.
Therefore, the federal courts' reluctance to find causes of action is not so
much the problem in itself, but rather a manifestation of their recognition of
other problems. The courts that presided over the ATCA cases examined in
this article were clearly reluctant to recognize ATCA claims against
multinational corporations; despite abundant and compelling facts, the
courts still dismissed most claims.
The Aldana court used a bewildering rationale to dismiss the plaintiffs'
claim of unlawful detention, while acknowledging that unlawful or arbitrary
detention does violate the law of nations. The court ruled that "[t]here is
often some egregious quality to the action that must be present for the
conduct to be a violation of international law cognizable under the
ATCA. ' ,79 The court effectively pulled out of thin air another element to
the cause of action created by the ATCA: only egregious violations. This
reasoning is directly contrary to Eastman Kodak v. Kavlin, which the
Aldana court actually cites to support its ruling.8 °
Eastman Kodak held that a determination of the length of detention is
arbitrary and not relevant to whether or not an action existed. The court
stated that "[t]he actionability of one plaintiff's claims cannot depend on the
degree of evil perpetrated on another plaintiff., 8 1 In Eastman Kodak, the
that with "deep reservations" the plaintiffs claim was
court concluded
82
actionable.
Under Eastman Kodak, the Aldana court should not have dismissed the
plaintiff s claim. Nonetheless, the Aldana court displayed its unwillingness
to uphold ATCA claims against corporations and held that the "[c]ourt's
review of other ATCA cases confirms that the added quality of
is what confers subject matter jurisdiction under the
egregiousness
83
ATCA.
In coming to a conclusion contrary to cited precedent, the court
necessarily belittled the suffering of the plaintiffs. In effect, the holding
stated that unless the plaintiffs suffered more than they had alleged in their
complaint, then the court would not find the claims actionable under the
Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2761.
305 F. Supp. 2d at 1296.
80 Id. at 1294 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1997)).
81Eastman, 978 F. Supp. at 1094.
78

79Aldana,

82 id.

83 Aldana, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1295.
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ATCA. 84 The court's aversion to ATCA claims against corporations was
such that the court was willing to find that being held overnight by armed
men who poked and shoved with weapons, and threatened the victims at
gunpoint for the purpose of avoiding a union-organized strike was not
arbitrary detention.8 5
The Eleventh Circuit, upholding the dismissal of the arbitrary
detention claim also based its holding on a questionable argument.8 6 The
court fixed blindly to the Supreme Court's statement in Sosa that "a single
illegal detention of less than a day ...

violates no norm of customary

international law.",8 7 The court did not consider the many differences
between the circumstances in Aldana and in Sosa, even though it
emphasized the Supreme Court's holding that international law88 is
necessarily static and requires some judgment on the part of the judges.
The Aldana district court also held that the plaintiffs failed to state a
cause of action for the right to organize and associate, and dismissed that
claim. The court found that the numerous authorities cited by the plaintiffs
in support of their claim "are only evidence of international law and do not
provide a basis for development of a customary norm of international law
that is actionable under the ATCA." 89 The cited authorities included
international conventions established by the United Nations, and provided
the perfect opportunity for the Aldana court to recognize the claims. In
fact, previous court precedent had used one of these conventions as
evidence of international law. 90 Nonetheless, the Aldana court held that the
evidence failed to establish the existence of "customary international law
for the right to associate and organize. '' 91 In Wiwa, the court dismissed one
of the claims for arbitrary arrest and detention in comparable perfunctory
manner, stating only that "[p]laintiffs provide only a cursory assertion that
Owens Wiwa 'had previously been arrested' ... at some undefined time in
14
85

Id. at 1296.

Id.

Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1248.
Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2769 (2004)).
88 Id. The circumstances of Alvarez-Machain's abduction in Sosa and the detention of the
union official plaintiffs in Aldana vary on many points. For example, Alavarez-Machain
assisted in torturing and murdering an individual on behalf of the Mexican police. AlvarezMachain was then detained by police and military while awaiting trial. In Aldana, however,
the union officials were mere workers attempting to organize. Those union workers were
harassed and kidnapped at gunpoint by a group of unknown, armed gunmen.
89 Aldana, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1297 (the plaintiffs cited the International Covenant for
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and Conventions 87 and 89 adopted by the International Labor Organization and the
ICCPR).
90 See Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1347 (N.D. Ga. 2002); see also
Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
91Aldana, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
86
87
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the past."92 The court held that this bare assertion was insufficient.
However, since the court granted leave to re-plead the claim,93 this ruling is
less revealing of the courts' reluctance to grant ATCA claims than that of
the other cases. Nonetheless, the court chose to dismiss the claim even
when it seemed clearly to be one of arbitrary arrest and detention. In
addition, and in direct contradiction with the Aldana opinion, the court
chose not to consider whether "as a matter of law, Owens Wiwa must plead
94
'prolonged' detention in order to assert a valid claim under the ATCA.,
In Sarei, the court held that the "plaintiffs [had] not articulated a
specific, universal and obligatory norm underlying this claim ' 95 and
dismissed their claim for cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. 96 Like
in Aldana, the plaintiffs offered evidence that cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment was a recognized violation of human rights97under international
law, but the court was unwilling to recognize the claim.
In both Sarei and Aguinda, despite particularly dire factual findings,
the environmental claims were dismissed. In Sarei, emissions from the
copper mine caused asthma and respiratory disorders, forced wildlife from
their natural habitat and destroyed crops.98 Waste from the mine polluted a
local river, turning fertile valleys into wastelands and exterminating fish
populations that villagers needed to survive. 99 The court justified its
dismissal by ruling that allowing the cause of action would violate the Act
of State Doctrine, which bars certain claims against foreign sovereigns. °°
Aguinda involved toxic waste that was pumped into the rainforest,
caused cancer and miscarriages, nearly rendered two indigenous tribes
extinct, and impacted residents of a neighboring country.' 0 The Second
Circuit held that Ecuador was an adequate forum for the case, despite the
plaintiffs contention that Ecuador did not recognize torts or mass claims,
and was inefficient and corrupt. 0 2 The court neither affirmed nor rejected
the district court's conclusion that "because environmental torts are unlikely
to be found to violate the law of nations, plaintiff's ATCA claim is unlikely
92 Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *20.
93 Id.

94Id. at n.6.
95Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1162.
96d.at 1162.
97Id. (plaintiffs offered the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as evidence of
international law).
98Id. at 1123.
99 Id.

o Id. at 1184-85 (The Act of State Doctrine only bars claims that involve an official act
of a foreign state, performed within its own territory, and that the claim seeks relief that
would require the court to declare the foreign sovereign's act invalid).
Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 470.
'0'
102 Id. at 478.
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10 3

to survive dismissal."
Despite the severity of these violations and the low standard for
surviving a motion to dismiss,'0 4 the federal courts chose not to recognize
these causes of actions. The courts used widely varying rationales in each
case as they looked for reasons to dismiss the claims, demonstrating an
apparent reluctance to grant causes of action under the ATCA. Thus far,
post-Sosa jurisprudence only serves to confirm this trend.
B. Lack of Clear Standards Leave Case Rulings Uncertain
Sosa did not add much clarity to the standards used to determine if a
cause of action exists against multinational corporations under the ATCA.
In fact, Sosa largely left the federal courts to determine if the law of nations
was implicated, stating that ATCA jurisprudence must inevitably "involve
an element of judgment about the practical consequences of making that
cause available to litigants in the federal courts."' 1 5 Sosa left the federal
courts as uncertain as ever.
The ATCA cases reveal two major areas of discrepancy. First, courts
are uncertain how to determine what constitutes a violation of the law of
nations. 106 Second, the federal courts have not agreed on a single standard
to apply to determine what constitutes state action. 107 This lack of clear
standards undermines the ATCA by creating disparate effects throughout
the United States.
08

1. The "Law of Nations",

As the Aldana court stated, "[d]efining customary international law is
no simple feat."' 1 9 It is no wonder, then, that the most contested element in
ATCA litigation is that the alleged tort must violate "the law of nations."'1 10
The cases examined here have taken slightly different views on the
meaning of the law of nations. It is undisputed that there are certain jus
cogens violations that always violate the law of nations, such as genocide,
slavery, torture and war crimes.'11 Recent case law has also established that
forced labor of any kind is a form of slavery, and therefore a jus cogens

Id. at 476.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
1o' Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2766-68 (2004).
106 See generally id. at 2739.
107 Bridgman, supra note 18, at 9.
103

104

108 Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2739.
109

Aldana, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1292.

110Id.

111See Unocal, 395 F.3d at 945.
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violation.1 12
In addition to the jus cogens violations, the Wiwa court also found that
the right to be free from arbitrary detention,'' the right to be free from
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 1 4 the right to life, liberty, and16
personal security, 1 5 and the right to peaceful assembly and expression"
were all rights guaranteed by the law of nations. Therefore, any denials of
these rights would "constitute fully recognized violations of international
law" and be actionable under the ATCA. 117 In coming to this conclusion,
the court cited international agreements such as the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights," 8 and the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 19
However, though the plaintiffs in Aldana cited similar conventions and
agreements, including the International Covenant for Civil and Political
Rights and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
court ruled that there was not customary international law prohibiting
violations of the right to peaceful assembly and expression. 20 The court
stated that "[t]he characteristics of customary international law are often
open to 'creative interpretation,' and this Court must progress
22 with
2
extraordinary care and restraint."' ' Sosa reinforced that sentiment. 1
In addition, while the Aguinda and Sarei decisions took contradicting
positions on whether an international convention was evidence of
international law, both courts reached the same result. When Aguinda first
came before the district court in 1994,123 the judge delayed ruling on
24
whether or not the alleged actions violated customary international law,
but appeared to be leaning towards recognizing international environmental
agreements such as the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
("Rio Declaration"), 125 as evidence of customary law. 26 The judge
112Id.

iwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *17.

113

114Id. at

"5

*24.
Id. at *33.

116id.

117Id. at *17 (quoting Xuncax v Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (S.D. Mass. 1995)).
118 Universal Declaration

of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,

pmble. & arts. 9-11, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UniversalDeclaration].

119Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, art. 2(2), S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 145 U.N.T.S. 85.
120 Aldana, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
121 Id. at 1299.

122 Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2755-56 (judges will have to exercise discretion in defining
international law).
123 Aguinda., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718, at *1.
124 Id. at *25.

125 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874.
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eventually held that "[n]ot all conduct which may be harmful to the
environment, and not all violations of environmental laws, constitute
violations of the law of nations,"' 127 and cited several U.S. statutes that he
believed were relevant to the discussion of when customary international
law prohibited specific actions. 128 Looking at the exact same agreement,
the Sarei court ruled that the Rio Declaration tended to disprove the
existence of customary international law for granting environmental
claims. 129 Rather, the court held that the Rio Declaration limited liability
for environmental harms only to the sovereign's responsibility
to prevent
30
the environmental harm from affecting other countries.'
Every case brought under the ATCA after Filartiga discusses the
meaning of the "law of nations." But even after the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Sosa, the courts are still without an exact meaning to "the law of
nations." As we saw from these cases, courts are unable to agree on what
customary international law consists of, even when interpreting the exact
same convention. Some courts recognize international covenants as proof
of an international consensus, while others do not.' 31 Still other courts see
international covenants as persuasive evidence that customary international
law does not exist. 132 Courts are unable to reach a consensus on when
international law exists, and have barely scratched the surface on
interpreting international law that already does exist.
2. State Action
The federal appellate courts have also had trouble determining when
there is "state action" under the ATCA. While courts are fairly consistent
with the general premise of state action articulated in Wiwa and Kadic (that
"plaintiffs usually must demonstrate that the defendant was a government
actor or committed the violation while acting 'under color of law"'),' 33 the
various federal appellate courts use different tests to determine if state
action is present. Of the tests articulated by the Supreme Court, 134 the
Second Circuit relies exclusively on the joint action test, as in Wiwa. 135 The
Ninth Circuit, which decided Sarei, emphasizes the joint action test but also
126

Aguinda, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718, at *22.

127Id.

at *24.
*23-24.

128Id. at

129Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.
130Id.

131
See Aguinda, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718, at *23-24.
132See Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
133 Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *9 (referring to Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d
232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995)).
134
See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).
135See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245; see also Bridgman, supra note 18, at 5-6.
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considers the proximate cause test. 136 The Fifth Circuit considers a
combination of many tests, including the nexus test, the symbiotic
relationship test, the joint action test and the public function test.137 Other
circuits, such as the Eleventh Circuit, have not had to answer the state
action question (as in Aldana) or have not yet determined how to approach
it. The Supreme Court never reached the question of state action, having
that the alleged violations in Sosa did not violate international
determined
138
law.
In sum, federal courts are inconsistent in their attempts to interpret the
"law of nations" and "state action." While it is not uncommon for the
federal appellate courts to interpret the same legislation in divergent ways,
the Supreme Court generally discourages these occurrences, and addresses
circuit splits as they arise. However, it can be argued that it is more
important that interpretations of the ATCA be consistent. Interpretations of
the ATCA affect not only those cases brought under the circuit's
jurisdiction but also have international ramifications. The U.S. federal
court system cannot hope to cover the entire international community with
one law, yet promulgate various interpretations of the same law.
This may result in such detrimental consequences as forum-shopping,
which the Supreme Court has held is undesirable. 139 Domestic federal
courts are simply not yet equipped to interpret international law when
international plaintiffs are suing international defendants with international
consequences. At the moment, however, there is no comparable alternative.
C. Courts That Allow Causes of Action Under the ATCA Impinge on the
Powers of Both the Executive and Legislative Branches of the United States
For the majority of human rights violations, private parties can only be
found liable if the plaintiff can show state action. 140 Therefore, even though
the ruling is technically against a private party, it is still a denunciation of a
sovereign state and can impinge on the functions, perhaps even the
constitutional duties, of the executive and legislative branches of the U.S.
government.' 41 In fact, the Department of Justice and the Department of
State have both submitted briefs arguing that the political question doctrine

136

See Unocal, 395 F.3d at 954. See also Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1116; Bridgman,

supra note 18, at 6-8.
137 Bridgman, supra note 18, at 8 (referring to Beanal v. Freeport McMoRan, Inc., 969 F.
Supp. 362 (E.D.La. 1997)).
138 Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2739.
139 Erie, 304 U.S. at 64.
140 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 232.
141See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Sosa, 124

S.Ct. at 2763 (citing Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001)).
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normally mandates the dismissal of ATCA claims. 14 2 The conflict between
the governmental branches was especially glaring in the case of In re South
African Apartheid Litigation, which was dismissed by the Southern District
Court of New York on November 29, 2004. 143
The plaintiffs in In re South African Apartheid Litigation sought to
hold corporations and businesses liable for any benefits they may have
received while under the rule of apartheid. 44 These benefits included the
advantage of conducting business in South Africa. Both the South African
and the U.S. governments took the position that granting jurisdiction in U.S.
federal courts undermined the identity of a sovereign nation, South Africa
specifically, and ignored the domestic remedies available in the nationality
country.' 4 The governments protested that ATCA litigation in this case
undermined the policy of confession and absolution deliberately chosen by
the South African government to avoid any semblance of "Victor's
Justice."' 146 The subsequent dismissal in the case indicates that the federal
courts are aware of, and sensitive to, the potential conflict with the other
branches of government. The court cited the Sosa decision, which in turn
referred to the early stages of In re South African ApartheidLitigation when
it recognized that "in such cases, there is a strong argument that federal
courts should give serious weight
to the Executive Branch's view of the
147
case's impact on foreign policy.'
The Executive Branch has weighed in on other cases as well. The
Department of Justice filed an amicus brief in response to the Unocal case,
stating that allowing ATCA claims would have "significant potential for
interference with the important foreign policy interests with the United
States, and is contrary to our constitutional framework and democratic
principles."' 4 s
The Sarei court also recognized a potential conflict with the executive
branch of the U.S. government, and thought it necessary to request a brief
or statement of interest from the executive branch. 49 A letter from the State
Department asserted that continued adjudication of this lawsuit "would risk
142Brief for the United States, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03339).
143 Ntsebeza v. Citigroup, Inc. (In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig.), 346 F. Supp. 2d 538
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
144 id.

145 Press Release, USA *Engage, USA *EngageHails Court Decision Limiting Use of
Alien Tort Provision:South African Lawsuits Dismissed(Nov. 30, 2004).
146 Sosa,

124 S.Ct. at 2766 (referring to In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d
1379 (JPML 2002)).
147 In re S. Afr. ApartheidLitig., 346 F. Supp. 2d at 554.
148Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d
708 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628).
149 Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1181.
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a potentially serious adverse impact on the [Bougainville] peace process,
and hence on the conduct of [U.S.] foreign relations."' 150 The Sarei court
responded by holding that "the court must accept the statement of foreign
policy provided by the executive branch as conclusive of its view on that
subject."151 25 ' As such, the court was unwilling to "unduly interfere with that
policy.
The Wiwa court also acknowledged the need for deference to the
executive branch, and followed Second Circuit precedent that courts
"consider whether resolution of the case will 'likely impact on international
relations' or 'embarrass or hinder the executive in the realm of foreign
relations."", 153 Under the unique circumstances of Wiwa, however, the court
was able to avoid this concern by ruling that the Act of State Doctrine
would not hinder its recognition of a cause of action because a new
democracy had already replaced the the government responsible for the
violations. 54 Needless to say, this unusual situation is not often the case.
Finally, the Supreme Court recognized the potential to impinge on the
legislative branch when it held that "this Court has recently and repeatedly
said that a decision to create a private right of action is one better left to
legislative judgment in the great majority., 155 U.S. courts agree that while
the ATCA confers jurisdiction to the federal courts, it does not explicitly
grant a private cause of action. This privilege is normally reserved for the
legislative branch. However, since courts now consistently read a private
cause of action into the ATCA, they have the responsibility to be restrictive
and responsible, so as not to abuse that privilege. The Court stated its
concern more succinctly in the same passage: "[T]he possible collateral
consequences of 1making
international rules privately actionable argue for
56
judicial caution."'
All of these opinions reflect the courts' awareness of a significant risk
of encroachment on the executive branch by interfering with foreign
relations concerns. Even though some plaintiffs today ask the courts to sit
in judgment of private corporations, and not governments, an accusation of
the corporate defendants necessarily implicates the sovereign state as well.
The judicial branch is unwilling to assume the responsibility for
maintaining diplomatic relations, or for turning legislation into a tool that
could jeopardize those relationships. The risk of diplomatic conflict would
be alleviated if the cases were relegated to an international body, rather than
150Id.
'5'Id.

152

at 1181-82.

Id.at 1181.

5 Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *92.

154 Id.

"' Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2762-63.
156 id.
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one sovereign state.
D. The United States is not an Appropriate Forum For All International
Human Rights Violations Committed by Multinational Corporations
Human rights advocates laud the ATCA as the means of allowing
victims worldwide to seek redress and hold corporations responsible for
certain actions. However, these advocates do not have to bear the immense
responsibility of creating and maintaining a forum in the United States for
potentially any international human rights violation. That responsibility
falls to the federal courts, and they tread very carefully.
In dismissing one of the plaintiffs' claims, the Aldana court stated that
"while Plaintiffs claim not to advocate that U.S. courts should be the forum
for all labor disputes worldwide, it is hard to imagine what claims of
violations of the fundamental right to associate and organize would
1' 57not be
heard under the ATCA if this Court allowed the claims to proceed."
In addition, the Aguinda court considered the possibility that U.S.
policy and jurisprudence, especially with regard to environmental policy,
would pervade the international community if U.S. courts were required to
become the forum for all international human rights violations committed
by multinational corporations. The court held that federal courts "should
exercise extreme caution when adjudicating environmental claims under
international law to insure that environmental policies of the 1United
States
58
do not displace environmental policies of other governments."'
The United States is also inappropriate as a forum for all human rights
claims against corporations because of its temporal potential. Even if
plaintiffs have absolutely no form of redress in their native country, and a
U.S. federal court decides to grant a cause of action, the more unsettling
question still looms large: What would happen if the United States decided
to shut the door? Plaintiffs who depended on the ATCA as a last resort
would be left without any remedy at all. Therefore, the United States is an
inappropriate forum not only because it would impose its policy beliefs on
the rest of the world, but also because it could disappear at any moment,
leaving plaintiffs without opportunity for redress.
This scenario might not come to pass. Congress has passed on more
than one opportunity to repeal the ATCA; the very issue of judicial
legislation and recognizing private rights of action was before Congress
when it passed the Torture Victim Protection Act. 159 In addition, the Senate
expressly declined to give the federal courts the task of interpreting and
157 Aldana, 305
...Aguinda,

F. Supp. at 1299.
142 F. Supp. 2d at 552 (citing Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d

161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999)).
9 Sosa,

124 S.Ct. at 2764.
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applying international human rights law when it considered ratification of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.1 60 Nonetheless,
the U.S. Constitution dictates that the issue of federal jurisdiction is wholly
within the province of the legislature. As the Supreme Court stated in Sosa,
"[i]t is enough to say that Congress may [shut the door] at any time, just as
so far as it rests on
it may modify or cancel any judicial decision
16 1
recognizing an international norm as such."'

Various interest groups are already lobbying Congress to reach this
very outcome, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and National
Foreign Trade Council. 162 If this happens, the international community will
be thrust back into the same situation as it was before human rights
violators were sued under the ATCA. That is, there will be no remedies
available for victims of human rights abuse because the international
community has not created a permanent forum to hear them. Furthermore,
it appears that so long as the ATCA exists, the international community will
make no progress on this issue. Instead, it will continue to rely on the court
system of only one nation. The responsibility of protecting the world's
citizens against the world's corporations is too great for any single
sovereign nation.
E. Human Rights Violators are Still not Prosecuted, Either Under the
ATCA or Otherwise
Even if some decisions are rendered against corporations under the
ATCA, the actual perpetrators themselves are not being prosecuted or
forced to defend their actions in a court of law. In Wiwa, the Nigerian
government never had to answer for its actions because it had been replaced
by a fledgling democracy. 163 In Aguinda, the Ecuadorian government
declined to waive sovereign immunity in the suit,' 64 and in Aldana, the
Guatemalan mayoral candidate who arrived at the union office while the
gunmen were there became the mayor. 165 Even after the plaintiffs'
allegations in Sarei, the United States attempted to facilitate the peace
process with the same Papua New Guinea government that presided over
the alleged violations. 166 None of the government actors who committed
the human rights violations were ever sued, nor were they ever required to
offer any remedy to the victims of their actions.
160 Id.
161 Id. at

2765-66.

162 See generally Jenna Greene, Use of 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act Against Business

Growing, 44 BROWARD DAILY Bus. REv. 158, July 24, 2003.
163 Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *93.
164 Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 470.

165Aldana, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1285.
166
Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
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The corporations that are being called into court to defend their actions
are often only tangentially related to the actual violations. The corporations
undeniably have some responsibility for the violations, and many violations
might not have taken place were it not for the involvement and potential
financial benefits of corporate investments, but oftentimes the corporation
and its employees do not commit any of the acts. Even if a court found the
multinational corporation liable under the ATCA for its actions, the actual
actors are not prevented from continuing to rape, murder, wrongfully
imprison, enslave, and otherwise impose their will on victims in their own
country. The state actors do not suffer the inconvenience of defending
themselves in court. They do not even have to deny the allegations. This
result detracts from the supposed value of the ATCA in preventing human
rights violations, and may help to hasten the ATCA's demise.
This is not to say that ATCA litigation against corporations is not
effective. In fact, suing corporations can be an effective means of
deterrence. After undergoing litigation, a corporation will be more cautious
with its international investments and in turn will put pressure on a hostcountry and its government actors. Nonetheless, ATCA litigation fails to
hold the actors directly responsible for their actions, and does not allow the
remedy to flow directly from the perpetrators to the victims. In order for
plaintiff complaints to be fully vindicated, an alternative form of redress
must be available. However, as long as plaintiffs are content to sue
corporations and believe that the ATCA can do justice to their claims, these
mechanisms will never be created.
V. CONCLUSION - A NEW INTERNATIONAL TREATY AND
TRIBUNAL
The days of litigation under the ATCA as a tool to prevent human
rights violations are numbered. The problems are too numerous and
pervasive. Moreover, a simple legislative bill in the United States could
nullify the ATCA and again leave victims with no recourse. Although
many multinational corporations implement codes of conduct, these are not
legally required nor binding, and no external mechanisms exist to enforce
them. In addition, many international treaties do not provide for remedies
or retributive action if they are broken or violated.'1
Furthermore, the
international tribunals established by the U.N., or by other regional
authorities such as the Organization of American States and the African
Union, are neither equipped nor designed to hear these cases. The

167 See

Universal Declaration, supra note 118; International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights, Dec.

16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S.

171;

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec.
Doc. D, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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International Court of Justice is available only to state parties, 168 and the
Inter-American Court of Human
Rights will also only hear cases submitted
69
to the court by state parties.1
The International Criminal Court ("ICC") 170 is the entity that serves a
function most similar to what plaintiffs need. The ICC allows individuals
to ask the prosecutor to investigate a case, and both individuals and states
can be defendants.
In addition, the ICC has the power to order
compensation to victims. 17' Nonetheless, the ICC is still insufficient. The
furor over bringing suits in the United States under the ATCA is evidence
that the ICC does not fulfill the need for an international judicial remedy.
The ICC has a specific, although growing, list of crimes that it may hear.
So far, the list includes only genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity
and the crime of aggression.17 ' Although "crimes against humanity"
includes other actionable crimes, the list is still specific and exclusive. In
addition, as of September 10, 2005, the Statute of the ICC has garnered
only 99 ratifications. 173 Of the relevant state parties in the four cases
examined here, only Nigeria and Ecuador have ratified
the Statute of the
75
174
Guatemala and Papua New Guinea have not.'
ICC.
It will eventually be necessary to either expand one of the existing
tribunals to incorporate cases like those being brought under the ATCA, or
to create a new one. Neither the United States, nor any other country, can be
expected to serve as the sole forum for all human rights violations brought
by common citizens. Multinational corporations must play a key role in the
process of creating a new tribunal. However, this will not be easy. In all of
the ATCA cases examined in this Article, the allure of financial incentives
from multinational corporations influenced government actions resulting in
human rights violations. Multinational corporations must also be willing to
submit to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, or engage in more responsible
practices when investing in suspect nations. With the exceptions of a few
exemplary corporations, this result is unlikely unless a market demand for
168 Statute of the International Court of Justice, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945, art. 3536, 59 Stat. 1031, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/
ibasicstatute.htm.
169 American Convention on Human Rights, entered into force July 18, 1978, art. 62,

1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/humanrts/oasinstr/
zoas3con.htm.
170 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
3,
reprintedin 37 I.L.M. 999.
171 Id.
172 Id.

173 UNITED

NATIONS,

http://www.un.org/law/icc.
174 id.
175 id.
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responsible practices develops to drive corporate decisions.
We may remain hopeful that the ICC, or one of the other existing
tribunals, will eventually be able to accommodate these cases. After all, the
covenants condemning human rights violations must be meant to have some
meaning. Nonetheless, the U.N. and other international or regional bodies
will probably not act to create a new tribunal. The U.N. has only acted to
create tribunals such as the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda when
calamitous and shocking crimes such as genocide have occurred. 176 These
tribunals are
highly specific and not equipped to handle global, large-scale
177
litigation.
The United States is working with other nations to create the Special
Commission on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments on Civil and Commercial Matters. 78 This new agreement would
help alleviate the burden on the United States and would govern the use of
domestic courts to rule on international issues. 179 It remains to be seen what
effect it would have if ratified.
The opinions of the four domestic U.S. cases examined here cast light
on an issue that has engendered a great deal of conflict. While the U.S.
federal courts are serving an admirable and necessary role to halt human
rights violations, it is not an appropriate role for them to play permanently.
The federal courts are aware of the dangers in allowing the United States to
serve as the default forum for human rights violations. Not only have they
been unable to articulate clear standards to apply, but they also risk
violating the political question doctrine. The courts are proactively
attempting to prevent a rising tide of ATCA-inspired litigation by refusing
to establish certain precedents. However, if they are thoroughly successful,
then human rights violations will go unaddressed in the world because there
is no other private civil forum available to these plaintiffs. Though this is
unfortunate, a greater danger arises if the courts are unsuccessful: The
United States will be cast in the inappropriate role of international judge
and jury. To avoid this outcome, a separate covenant and tribunal
incorporating the business world must be established.
This proposed solution to the dilemma is unlikely to occur soon. As
long as the world, and human rights activists in particular, believe that the
176 See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993)

(resolving to establish an international tribunal pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations).
177 Id.

178 Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements (Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Special Commission on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Work Doc. No. 11OE Apr. 2004), available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/j dgm-.wdI 10_e.pdf.
179 id.
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ATCA is the answer to human rights violations, we will not turn our
attention to creating a long-lasting solution. It is crucial that the
international community recognize that the ATCA, however useful, cannot
serve indefinitely as the world's answer to human rights violations. There
are too many irreconcilable issues. Only once we are able to face this fact
can we begin tackling the obstacles to creating an international tribunal.
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